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INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' was thrust into
the spotlight in 1998, when two disabled golfers brought sepa-
rate actions for permission to use golf carts in professional tour-
naments.2 Casey Martin, a golfer whose disability prevents him
from walking an entire round of golf, brought suit against the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 ( 9 h Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3023 (U.S. Sep. 26, 2000) (No.
00-24); Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp.2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), afrd, 205
F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sep. 20, 2000) (No. 00-434).
1
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Professional Golf Association Tour ("PGA Tour" or "Tour") for
an exception to that entity's "no-cart" rule.3 Ford Olinger, also a
professional golfer with a comparable disability, sued the
United States Golf Association (USGA), arguing that he should
be allowed to use a cart in U.S. Open competition. 4 Both Martin
and Olinger have asserted similar arguments with different re-
sults. Martin has won his suit,5 while Olinger has not.6 The
conflicting judicial interpretations of the ADA's Title III provi-
sions7 has led to vast public attention, due in part to the impor-
tance that sports play in our society.8 While the Martin and
Olinger cases involve almost identical issues, it is Martin that
has received almost all the media attention.9 The majority of
this coverage has focused on society's conflicting views of the
case. On one hand, there are those who look at Martin as a
courageous hero fighting for what he deserves. Martin has been
called a "role model... [who has]... empower[ed] people with
disabilities. " 10 One writer concludes that he should be "on pos-
ters, not in court papers."" The Martin controversy even re-
ceived a political response, when Senators Bob Dole and Tom
Harkin spoke on behalf of Casey. 12
The emotional response on the other side of the argument
is just as strong. Many opposed to the "no-cart" policy waiver
have relied on a "slippery slope" argument, concluding that this
accommodation will "open a Pandora's box with far-reaching ef-
3. Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter Martin II].
4. See Olinger, 55 F. Supp.2d 926, 928 (N.D. Ind. 1999) [hereinafter Olinger I].
5. See Martin, 204 F.3d 994 (9' Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Martin III].
6. See Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Olinger III.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994) [hereinafter Title III].
8. See Laura F. Rothstein, Don't Roll in My Parade: The Impact of Sports and
Entertainment Cases on Public Awareness and Understanding of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 19 REV. LITIG. 399, 411 (2000) (referring to the Martin case
as the most highly publicized case on the issue of whether a particular program is
subject to Title III of the ADA).
9. See Thomas Heath, Martin Gives Emotional Testimony in Courtroom;
Golfer Recounts Pain From Leg Disorder, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1998, at Cl; Harry
Blauvelt, Judge Says Golfer Martin Can Ride Cart, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1998, at
1C.
10. Harry Blauvelt, Martin Now Ready to Compete PGA's Finchen Wonders if
Others Will Request Carts, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1998, at 6C.
11. A Good Walk Spoiled; The PGA Doesn't Get It, GREENSBORO NEWS & RE-
CORD, Feb. 1, 1998, at F2.
12. See Thomas Bonk, Casey Case: Tour Has Cartload of Trouble, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1998, at Cll.
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fects," 13 resulting in "tremendous changes in American
sports."1 4 As columnist Tom D'Agostino has noticed, a common
emotional response is "[w]hy shouldn't the PGA be able to make
its own set of rules that apply to everyone equally? Who is some
non-golfing judge in Oregon to say that walking isn't an essen-
tial part of the game?" 5 Others have even gone so far as to at-
tack Martin's skills on the links. 6
Probably the strongest sentiment against the allowance of
carts has come from the colleagues of Martin and Olinger. For-
mer U.S. Open Champion Ken Venturi testified against Olin-
ger's cause, explaining the importance of walking the course. 17
Golf greats Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus testified to the
same effect against Martin.' 8 Even Tiger Woods, Martin's col-
lege teammate at Stanford, stated his opposition to the use of
carts in tournaments, fearing an unfair advantage over other
players. 19
The societal interest in these cases, where professional
sports meets the law, has only increased in recent months. This
revived concern has been fueled by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to grant certiorari 20 to review the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Martin that upheld his right to use a cart.2' The problem with
popular media attention is that, for the most part, it is based on
pure emotional responses rather than the statutory and legal
issues raised by the controversy. These legal aspects, which
will decide the ultimate fate of the controversy, have been given
13. Joe Gordon, Golf Notes: Authority an Issue - Martin Case Weakens PGA,
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 1998, at B29.
14. Tom D'Agostino, Casey Martin Golf Cart Case About Fairness; ADA Not
Con Artist's Tool, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, March 9, 1998, at B5.
15. Id.
16. See Jerry Potter, Martin's Accomplishments Will Always Have Asterisk,
USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1998, at 6C (commenting that "[wihatever he accomplishes as
a player he'll always have an asterisk by his name"). Id.
17. See Olinger I, 55 F. Supp.2d at 934.
18. See Bruce Balestier, Simpson Team Makes Par Getting Cart Into PGA
Tour, N.Y.L.J., May 8, 2000, at col. 4.
19. See Joel Stein, A Walk, Spoiled, PEOPLE, Jan. 26, 1998, at 77.
20. 69 U.S.L.W. 3023 (U.S. Sep. 26, 2000) (No. 00-24).
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, Should High Court Review Case of Disabled
Golfer?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at col. 4; Marianne Means, Keep ADA Within Rea-
son, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct. 4, 2000, at A15; No Carts for Pro Golfers, SARA-
SOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, October 5, 2000, at A14.
3
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considerable attention by legal scholars. 22 Emotional aspects
aside, the Martin and Olinger cases cannot be examined or un-
derstood without a detailed analysis of the statutory issues in-
volved: 1) whether a golf course used for a professional
tournament is a "place of public accommodation" within the
meaning of the ADA 23 and 2) whether the use of a golf cart in
this type of professional competition would "fundamentally al-
ter" the nature of the tournaments. 24
This article attempts to analyze the issues raised by the
facts in Martin and Olinger in light of this statutory framework.
Part I analyzes the two cases separately, including their facts,
the arguments of all parties, and the courts' reasoning. Part II
explores the Americans with Disabilities Act, including a look
at the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act, an earlier
counterpart and model to the ADA, provides useful insight into
ADA issues. Part III analyzes other federal district and circuit
court cases interpreting Title III of the ADA in the context of
competitive sports. These decisions provide insight into how
judges have interpreted the statute, thus providing guidance in
analyzing how the Supreme Court may interpret the statute.
Part IV explores Supreme Court decisions that are analogous to
the situation at hand. Indeed, the court has analyzed what con-
stitutes a "place of public accommodation" and a "fundamental
alteration" in contexts outside the ADA,25 but has never ana-
lyzed these provisions in an ADA Title III case. Part V then
analyzes the questions of law in Martin and Olinger in light of
22. Many scholarly articles were published in response to the District Court
and Circuit Court opinions in Martin and Olinger. See, e.g., Christopher M. Par-
ent, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
26 J. LEGIS. 123 (2000); Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Pen-
alty: Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. and Discriminatory Boundaries in the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 18 LAw & INEQ. J. 131 (2000); Sean Baker, The Casey Martin
Case: Its Possible Effects on Professional Sports, 34 TULSA L.J. 745 (1999); Kenneth
E. Neikirk, Fore! The Americans with Disabilities Act Tees Off at Professional
Sports in Martin v. PGA Tour Inc., But Will It Make the Cut?, 36 Hous. L. REV.
1867 (1999); Patty Maitland, Riding A Cart on Golfs "Unfairways" Martin v. PGA
Tour, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 627 (1999); Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled:
Casey Martin and the ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement in Competi-
tive Settings, 77 OR. L. REV. 1337 (1998); Bryon L. Koepke, The Americans with
Disabilities Act and Professional Golf-Breaking Par, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 699 (1999).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
25. See infra Part IV.
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past case law, which provides several different lines of reason-
ing. The analysis ends with the prediction that the Supreme
Court will affirm the present holding in Martin. Finally, Part
VI concludes with the argument that affirming the Martin hold-
ing is the proper result, in terms of the law and social policy.
PART I - Martin & Olinger, Conflicting Viewpoints
A. The Martin Case
Casey Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syn-
drome, a disease that curtails blood circulation in his right leg.26
Martin's condition, classified as a congenital deformity, has
caused his leg to become severely atrophied and weakened. 27
Not only is walking painful, but the mere act places him at sig-
nificant health risks.28 Martin's treating physician testified
that it is medically necessary for his patient to be permitted to
use a cart while playing golf. 29 Thus, Martin is physically una-
ble to walk the golf course, as required by the rules set up by the
defendant, PGA Tour.30
26. See Casey Martin v PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998).
[hereinafter Martin I].
27. Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1243.
28. See id. (The risks associated with walking include risk of tibia fracture,
due to the increasing loss of bone stock and the weakening of this bone over Mar-
tin's lifetime. In addition, medical testimony introduced by Martin indicates that
walking places Martin at a risk of hemorrhaging, as well as an increased chance of
developing blood clots). See id.
29. See id. at 1244. Dr. Jones summarized Martin's condition as follows:
a rare congenital vascular malformation . . . which has led to, number one,
chronic pain secondary to vascular engorgement and progressive loss of
bone stock, pain so severe that he has at least considered to explore the use
of time contingent narcotics; number two, a documented sleep disorder...
which leads ... to an exhaustion syndrome; number three, the need to wear
two compression stockings at all times; number four, it has resulted in
marked muscular atrophy and weakness in his right calf; number five, it
has affected his knee through multiple intra-articular bleeds, causing ab-
normalities which are painful; and number six, and most important from
the orthopedic aspect, it has resulted in a weakened tibia which is at risk for
fracture and potential limb loss and/or serious post-fracture complications.
Id.
30. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1322 (discussing the PGA's "no cart" rule,
requiring the players to walk in the PGA Tour and the Nike Tour). See also
Koepke, supra note 22, at 699.
5
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The controversy at hand began when Martin was qualifying
for the PGA Tour (referred to as the "qualifying school tourna-
ment") and requested that the Tour accommodate his disability
by granting him a waiver of the "no cart" rule.31 Martin then
filed suit, pursuant to the ADA, seeking to enjoin the defen-
dant's "no cart" rule during this qualifying tournament, and on
the PGA and Nike Tours. 32 Martin's basic assertion was that by
failing to provide him with a cart, the PGA Tour failed to make
its tournaments accessible to individuals with disabilities in vi-
olation of the ADA.33 The United States District Court for the
District of Oregon granted Martin a preliminary injunction,
thereby directing the defendant to allow the golfer to use a cart
during the qualifying tournament.3 4 Thereafter, Martin scored
well enough to qualify for the Nike Tour, which is run by the
PGA Tour, thus forcing his ADA-based suit to continue.35 The
court subsequently extended the injunction by stipulation of
both parties to include the first two tournaments on the Nike
Tour. 36
The defendant then moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the ADA does not apply to it or its tournaments. 37 The
PGA Tour asserted that it was exempt because it is a private
non-profit establishment, and in the alternative that the tour-
nament competitions are not "places of public accommodation"
within the meaning of the ADA.38 The court denied the motion,
holding that the PGA Tour is not a private entity that is exempt
from ADA coverage and that it does in fact operate a "place of
public accommodation."39
In deciding that the PGA Tour is not a private organiza-
tion, United States Magistrate Judge Coffin analyzed a set of
factors, including genuine selectivity, membership control, his-
tory of organization, use of facilities by nonmembers, club pur-
pose, whether the club advertises for its members, and whether
31. See Parent, supra note 22, at 133.
32. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
38. See id. at 1322-23.
39. See id. at 1327.
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the club is nonprofit. 40 Judge Coffin's conclusion focused almost
entirely on the fact that although the Tour is nonprofit, "its fun-
damental purpose is to enhance profits for its members. '41 The
court relied on a Fifth Circuit decision that interpreted the pri-
vate membership exception to the Civil Rights Act, and held
that a credit union is not a private organization because they
"exist for purely mercantile purposes and although they may be
organized on a nonprofit basis, members join credit unions in
search of profits on their investments."42 Judge Coffin's analy-
sis concluded that the PGA Tour, like a credit union, is non-
profit, however, its fundamental purpose is to enhance profits
for its members. 43 Therefore, it cannot receive exempt status."
The second argument raised by the defendant, that golf
courses being used for pro tournaments are not "places of public
accommodation," was also rejected. 45 The Tour made the com-
pelling argument that the only parts of the course open to the
public are those actually accessed by the public at large, and
therefore the playing area is not a "place of public accommoda-
tion" because the public is not allowed in this area. 46 Unfortu-
nately for the PGA, Judge Coffin did not find the contention
compelling or persuasive. First, he noted that a golf course is
specifically listed within the examples of the term "public ac-
commodation" in the ADA.47 Next, Judge Coffin strictly ad-
hered to this statutory listing, refusing to entertain the
assertion that places of public accommodation can have zones of
ADA applicability and non-applicability. 48 The court reiterated
this holding with the statement that no organization can "rele-
gate the ADA to hop-scotch areas."49
Finally, Judge Coffin explained his holding with a hypo-
thetical situation of ADA applicability, wherein a professional
40. See id. at 1325. The factors used by the court were set forth in United
States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989), affirmed, 894
F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990).
41. Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
42. Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 133 (5 th Cir. 1980).
43. See Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
44. See id. at 1323.
45. See id. at 1326.
46. See id.
47. See id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994)).
48. See Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
49. Id.
7
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golfer hires a disabled caddy. "Once the caddy steps within the
boundaries of the playing area of the golf course... does he step
outside the boundaries of the ADA simply because the public at
large cannot join him there?"50 Judge Coffin's broad interpreta-
tion of the ADA provisions seemed to hint at how he would
eventually decide the Martin case, in favor of the plaintiff.51
After holding that the Tour is not exempt from ADA cover-
age, the only real issue at trial was whether accommodating
Martin's disability with the use of the cart would work a "funda-
mental alteration" of the nature of its business or programs,
which, as will be shown below, is not required by the Americans
with Disabilities Act.52 Arguing that cart use would result in a
"fundamental alteration," the PGA Tour's plan was to show the
importance of walking in PGA tour competitions.
The court noted at the outset of its analysis that "the bur-
den focuses on the specifics of the plaintiffs or defendant's cir-
cumstances and not on the general nature of the
accommodation."53 The court made clear that the ultimate is-
sue in the case was whether allowing Casey Martin, given his
individual circumstances, the requested modification would
fundamentally alter PGA and Nike Tour golf competitions. 54
This became a huge factor in Judge Coffin's decision, as can be
seen with the comment "[a]s plaintiff easily endures greater fa-
tigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by
walking, it does not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA
Tour's game to accommodate him with a cart."55
The court came to this conclusion despite the Tour's at-
tempts to show that required walking puts a fatigue factor into
golf that is crucial in a tournament. The defendant offered the
testimony of professional golfers swearing to the advantage one
golfer would have over others if he were not required to walk
the course.56 Nevertheless, Judge Coffin's specific inquiry test
found that walking a course cannot compare with the fatigue
and pain Martin feels by playing a round of golf. "To perceive
50. Id. at 1327.
51. See Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1242.
52. See infra Part II.
53. Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 1252.
56. See id. at 1250.
[Vol. 21:411
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that the cart puts him - with his condition - at a competitive
advantage is a gross distortion of reality."57 The court relied
heavily on medical testimony stating that the fatigue factor in-
jected into golf by walking the course could be deemed insignifi-
cant.58 In the end, the court continued with its individual
inquiry and assessed the requested modification in light of the
specifics of his disability. The opinion concludes, "[tihe re-
quested accommodation of a cart is eminently reasonable in
light of Casey Martin's disability."59
Not surprisingly, the PGA Tour appealed the permanent
injunction issued by the district court. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, thus upholding Martin's right to use a cart within PGA
Tour competition.60 On the issue of whether Title III of the
ADA's "public accommodation" requirement applied to the PGA
Tour, the Tour renewed its argument that the competition area
is not a public accommodation because the public has no right to
enter it.61 Much like the district court, the Ninth Circuit denied
this argument and held that "[tihe fact that entry to a part of a
place of public accommodation may be limited does not deprive
the facility of its character as a public accommodation." 62
The Ninth Circuit went further than the district court did
in analyzing a golf course as a "place of public accommodation."
The court addressed the Tour's argument that the competition
itself is not public because it is restricted to the nation's best
golfers. The court attacked this argument, pronouncing, "the
fact that users of a facility are highly selected does not mean
that the facility cannot be a public accommodation." 63 Noting
that any member of the public that pays an entrance fee and
obtains two letters of recommendation can try out for the quali-
fying school, the court found it obvious that the course is a place
of public accommodation.6 4
The court devoted more attention to the second issue on ap-
peal, whether the accommodation of permitting Martin to use a
57. Id. at 1252.
58. See Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
59. Id. at 1253.
60. See Martin III, 204 F.3d 994.
61. See id. at 997.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 998.
64. See id. at 999.
9
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golf cart fundamentally alters the PGA Tour and Nike Tour
Competitions. The analysis began with the acceptance of the
district court's findings of fact, including the determination that
while the purpose of the "no cart" rule is to inject a fatigue fac-
tor into the game, this fatigue can be deemed insignificant. 65
The PGA Tour again reiterated the argument used in the
court below, that since the "no cart" rule is substantive, it can-
not be modified to accommodate a disability.66 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, like the district court, denied this argument. The court
stressed a specific inquiry into the issue of fundamental altera-
tion, as Judge Coffin had below, and framed the issue as
"whether the use of a cart by Martin"67 would fundamentally
alter the competition, not "whether the use of carts generally"68
would do so. The court accepted the district court's fact deter-
minations, and thus declared that Martin's use of a golf cart
would not fundamentally alter the nature of PGA Tour
competition. 69
In making its decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed an ar-
gument that had not been raised in the district court opinion.
The Tour presented a "slippery slope" argument, claiming that
permitting cart use would open the door to future changes in
sports, like head starts for runners and swimmers, which had
been rejected.70 The court showed its confidence that the spe-
cific, fact based inquiry that must be applied in these cases will
result in no such changes, as they would be fundamental altera-
tions.71 Once again, this shows the reliance on a fact based, in-
dividualized test when determining whether a modification will
result in a fundamental alteration.
After the controversial holding of the Ninth Circuit was
handed down, the PGA Tour filed a petition for a writ of certio-
65. See Martin III, 204 F.3d at 1000 (court found there was ample evidence to
support these findings of fact, and therefore they are not clearly erroneous).
66. See id. at 1000.
67. Id. at 1001.
68. Id. (court went on to state that "the evidence must focus on the specifics of
the plaintiffs or defendant's circumstances and not on the general nature of the
accommodation"). Id.
69. See id. at 1002.
70. See Martin III, 204 F.3d at 1001.
71. See id.
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rari, which was granted on September 26, 2000.72 The possible
dispositions of the Supreme Court decision in Martin are engag-
ing, not only because the case will result in new Supreme Court
precedent, but also due to the conflicting ADA interpretations of
the Seventh Circuit in Olinger.73
B. The Olinger Case
Like Martin, Ford Olinger suffers from a condition that un-
doubtedly classifies him as a disabled individual within the
meaning of the ADA, bilateral avascular necrosis.7 4 This condi-
tion "makes it nearly impossible for him to walk an 18-hole golf
course."75 Olinger applied to play in the 1998 U.S. Open and
requested the use of a golf cart, a request that the USGA
quickly denied.76 Olinger then brought suit under the ADA,
just 4 days before the qualifying tournament was scheduled to
begin in Indiana.7 7 Due to these circumstances, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted Olinger
a temporary restraining order, thereby allowing him to partici-
pate in the qualifying round.78 Consequently, Olinger rode a
cart, but failed to qualify for the U.S. Open.7 9
When the Olinger action came to trial, the district court
was forced to grapple with the same issues present in Martin;
whether a golf course operated by the USGA for tournament
purposes is a "place of public accommodation," and whether the
72. 69 U.S.L.W. 3023 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 00-24).
73. See Olinger H, 205 F.3d 1001.
74. See Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp.2d 926. Like Casey Martin, this disability signif-
icantly impairs his ability to walk.
75. See id. at 929.
76. See Olinger II, 205 F.3d at 1004.
77. See id.
78. See Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929 (court concluded that a temporary
restraining order was appropriate, recognizing the circumstances that 1) exclusion
from the local qualifying would have meant that Olinger could not participate in
the 1998 championship even if he prevailed on his ADA claim before the champion-
ship began; 2) this order would only apply to the local qualifying because it would
expire before sectional qualifying; 3) in light of an agreement between the USGA
and Casey Martin, Mr. Olinger would not be the only golfer to ride in local qualify-
ing). See id. The agreement to which the court is referring is that the USGA vol-
untarily agreed to abide by the ruling in the Casey Martin case. Thus, when
Martin was successful in his action, he was also allowed to ride in the 1998 U.S.
Open. See Olinger H, 205 F.3d at 1004.
79. See Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp.2d at 929.
11
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use of a cart in these tournaments would represent a "funda-
mental alteration" of the nature of the USGA program.80 The
court ultimately held that the course operated by the USGA
was a "place of public accommodation" within the ADA, but it
contradicted the Martin decision by ruling that the modification
of USGA rules to allow golf cart use would "fundamentally al-
ter" the nature of the competition.8'
On the issue of "public accommodation," the USGA raised
arguments very similar to those raised by the PGA in Martin,
specifically that only the part of the course open to the public,
those "outside the ropes," are within the authority of the ADA.8 2
The court rejected this argument, in part relying on Martin, for
the declaration that neither the ADA, nor the Department of
Justice regulations implementing it, provides for "a private en-
clave in a public accommodation."8 3 The court also rested its
holding on a series of Title III cases involving the NCAA and its
determination of eligibility requirements for college athletes.8 4
None of the courts that decided these cases found Title III lim-
ited to areas outside the roped off, competitive field, court or
pool.8 5 This factor, combined with the court's determination
that "nothing supports a finding that . . . barrier ropes limit
Title III"86 led the court to conclude that the ADA does in fact
apply to areas of competition and the areas "outside the
ropes."87
The "fundamental alteration" issue is where the court's
analysis sharply divides with that in Martin. First, the court
distinguished Olinger from Martin because its ruling "no doubt
appears to conflict with that well publicized holding."88 Next,
the court recognized that the use of a golf cart is a reasonable
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 932.
83. See Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp.2d at 932 (citing Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Olinger I, 55 F. Supp.2d. at 933 n.4. The court first declared that Martin
has no precedential impact on this court, and stated differences in the cases.
These include: 1) this case focuses on a single event, not a series of multi-level
weekly tournaments as in Martin; 2) the parties in Martin presented different evi-
dence, so the records differ. See id.
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modification in "the general sense,"8 9 because the golf cart "has
become so ubiquitous in the sport"90 that any challenge to that
assertion would be "doomed."91 The court declared that once
this element of "general reasonableness" 92 is established, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the modification
would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the public
accommodation. 93
The opinion went on to declare that proof of a fundamental
alteration must "focus on the specific circumstances" rather
than reasonableness in general.94 The court concentrated en-
tirely on the specific program in issue, but in no way analyzed
the specific situation of the plaintiff. This is almost the opposite
approach taken by both the Ninth Circuit and the district court
in Martin.95 Those opinions focused almost entirely on the spe-
cific situation of the disabled plaintiff, and the effect granting
him the requested modification would have on the program.96
This court never considered the effect that allowing Olinger the
modification would have on the program, but chose to look at
the modification in terms of how it would affect this specific pro-
gram (the USGA) in future applications.
The analysis began with the court's acceptance of medical
testimony that the use of a golf cart can provide one golfer with
a competitive advantage over another player who walks.97 This
acceptance of some type of fatigue factor injected in the game by
89. Id. at 934.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Olinger I, 55 F. Supp.2d at 934
94. Id. The court declared that the:
proper inquiry, then, is not whether the requested accommodation would
amount to a fundamental alteration in the game of golf (plainly, it would
not), but rather whether the requested accommodation would constitute 'a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a program... and the 'program' here
at issue is the U.S. Open.
Id.
95. See infra Part L.A (discussing the approach taken by the courts in Martin).
96. See id.
97. See Olinger I, 55 F. Supp.2d at 935 (the court recognized that this advan-
tage may not apply to Olinger because he is not a "similar" golfer to others on the
course). Still though, the fact that the court accepts a fatigue factor injected into
the game by walking is a distinguishing factor between this case and Martin. See
id. at 926.
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walking is a major one, because the courts in Martin deemed
this factor insignificant.98 The court acknowledged that the fa-
tigue Olinger endures after a round with a cart may in fact be
more than "a healthy Tiger Woods," 99 but the court in no way
used this fact in its determination of the fundamental alteration
issue. 100 Instead, the Olinger court focused specifically on the
administrative burdens and problems that allowing the modifi-
cation to the "no-cart" rule would have on the USGA. The court
hypothetically asked what would happen if a disabled person
applies to play with a cart next year: "how will that applicant be
compared to Ford Olinger? Will next year's applicant.., have a
competitive advantage over Mr. Olinger if allowed to ride? Will
Mr. Olinger have a competitive advantage . .. if both are al-
lowed to ride?"101
The court concluded that the requested modification was
not reasonable, because the administrative burden of requiring
"that someone be given the discretion to allow one competitor a
potential advantage denied to others would fundamentally alter
the nature of the competition. '10 2 Since the only possible way to
eliminate this problem would be to allow all players the option
of carts, thereby changing the entire scope of the game, the
court determined this a "fundamental alteration. " 10 3
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court,
thereby creating a circuit split on the scope of Title 111.104 The
circuit court decided the appeal on narrow grounds, simply
sidestepping the "place of public accommodation" issue, and
holding that the use of a cart would "fundamentally alter the
nature of the competition.' 105
98. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 (9 th Cir. 2000).
99. Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp.2d at 937.
100. It is important to note that in Martin the district court held that because
Casey endures more fatigue just by playing with a cart than other golfers who
walk the course, the modification was reasonable. See Martin 1, 994 F.Supp. 1252.
The district court in Olinger was not persuaded by this idea, instead focusing on
the administrative problems the modification would cause the USGA. See Olinger
I, 55 F. Supp.2d at 937.
101. Olinger 1, 55 F. Supp.2d at 937.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See Olinger 11, 205 F.3d at 1007.
105. Id. at 1005. The court declared that:
424 [Vol. 21:411
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/4
2001] CASEY MARTIN AND FORD OLINGER CASES 425
Olinger's main contention on appeal was essentially that
the USGA failed to present proof, "responsive . . . [to his] ...
personal circumstances,"'10 6 that in fact allowing a cart would be
a fundamental alteration. 0 7 According to Olinger, the testi-
mony below did not support the conclusion, because it "did not
bear on Mr. Olinger at all." 08 The appellate court affirmed the
decision below without addressing this contention, basically
adopting the lower court's holding because the findings of fact,
that stamina is involved in golf, are "amply supported by the
evidence."' 09 Since stamina and walking are considered impor-
tant for purposes of competition and "tradition,"'110 the reason-
ing concluded, taking these factors out of the competition would
be a fundamental alteration."'
The court also adopted the concept of an "administrative
burden" present in evaluating requests for waivers of the "no-
cart" rule. 1 2 The court agreed with the district court that it
should be "unnecessary" for the USGA to "develop a system and
a fund of expertise to determine whether a given applicant truly
needs, or merely wants, or could use but not need, to ride a cart
to compete."" 3 The opinion ended with a hint of deference to
the USGA in making decisions about the rules of golf, assuming
that "the decision on whether the rules of the game should be
adjusted ... is best left to those who hold the future of golf in
trust."1 14
[elven assuming that the competitive part of the golf course on which the
U.S. Open is played is a place of public accommodation covered by the ADA,
Mr. Olinger cannot prevail because we believe his use of a cart during the
tournament would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. If relying on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Martin, one can argue
that Olinger has a very strong contention. See infra Part I.A.
109. Olinger 11, 205 F.3d at 1006 (the court made this assessment due to testi-
mony of Ken Venturi and Dennis Hepler, players who testified to the importance of
stamina in golf, and Dr. Holland, who testified to the same effect). See id.
110. Id. at 1007.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Olinger 11, 205 F.3d at 1007.
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PART II - The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to address the discrimina-
tion that disabled Americans encounter in a variety of life situa-
tions. The congressional purpose was to "provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities." 15 At the time of
the ADA's creation, Congress noted that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities"
which had resulted in significant discrimination." 6 Under the
ADA, discrimination is described as the "failure to make reason-
able modifications.., when such modifications are necessary to
afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities."" 7 An entity
subject to the statute can avoid liability only if it can show that
the modification requested "would fundamentally alter" that
entity, its programs, or purposes." 8
The ADA is a comprehensive statute covering many types
of "disabilities" including the mentally disabled, recovering
drug addicts, alcoholics, and people stricken by HIV." 9 The
statute is divided into four titles, each covering different types
of entities. Title I of the ADA applies directly to employers who
discriminate based on disability.120 The section prevents cov-
ered entities from discriminating in the areas of job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). This section declares:
It is the purpose of this chapter-(i) to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable stan-
dards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to
ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabili-
ties; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peo-
ple with disabilities.
Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
118. Id.
119. See Tanya R. Sharpe, Casey's Case: Taking a Slice Out of the PGA Tour's
No-Cart Policy, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 783, 787 (1999).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
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employee compensation, job training, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment. 121 In order to succeed on a claim under
Title I, a plaintiff must establish that he or she was a qualified
individual with a disability and that the employer excluded the
plaintiff because of the disability or that the employer failed to
create a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiffs
disability.122
Title II is aimed at public entities, making it a violation of
the statute for them to discriminate against or exclude quali-
fied, disabled individuals from participating in or receiving the
benefits of their services, programs, or activities. 123 The ADA
describes a "public entity" as "(A) any State or local govern-
ment; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local govern-
ment." 24 An example of an entity covered under this title would
be public transportation. 25 Title IV provides for telecommuni-
cations accessibility requirements applicable to disabled per-
sons. 26 This section applies to the Federal Communications
Commission, requiring them to offer services to hearing and
speech-impaired individuals. 27
Title III is the relevant provision under analysis in the
Martin and Olinger cases. This provision prohibits discrimina-
tion based on disability in the "full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any place of public accommodation." 128 The title also
declares that "discrimination includes failure to make reasona-
ble modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
such modifications are necessary to afford "such ... accommo-
dations ... unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the] ...
accommodations" being offered. 29 Title III gives an illustrative
list of entities which "are considered public accommodations for
121. See Parent, supra note 22, at 130.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12184 (1994) (speaking directly to public transportation).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
127. See Parent, supra note 22, at 131.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
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the purposes of this subchapter," within which a golf course is
specifically listed.130
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973131 is an earlier statute
aimed at discrimination that served as a model for the ADA. 132
Therefore, in any attempt to interpret the scope and intended
meaning of the ADA, this Act can prove to be informative. The
statute sought to protect the disabled who were employed by
either the federal government or employers receiving federal
assistance.133
The "reasonable accommodation" requirement in the ADA
was first announced in the Rehabilitation Act in terms of em-
ployer duties. 34 Although the statute was a substantial step in
attacking disability discrimination, it had inherent weaknesses.
First, what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" was
never defined within the Rehabilitation Act, leaving employers
subject to the Act with no guidelines with which to work. 135
Also, the Act offered no protection for the disabled in many ar-
eas, including private employment, public accommodations,
transportation, and state and local activities and services. 136
These weaknesses led to the birth of the ADA, which expressly
speaks to the shortcomings of the Rehabilitation Act. Due to
the relationship of these statutes, decisions interpreting the Re-
habilitation Act provide "useful guidance," as the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted in Olinger.137
PART III - Title III in Competitive Sports
A review of the Title III cases shows that the ADA's appli-
cation to competitive sports has been limited. In fact, there is
no relevant Supreme Court precedent speaking directly to the
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994).
132. See Parent, supra note 22, at 124.
133. See Neikirk, supra note 22, at 1875.
134. See Parent, supra note 22, at 125.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 126.
137. Olinger 11, 205 F.3d at 1006 n.6 (citing Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7 th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that "[blecause the
ADA is patterned in large measure on the Rehabilitation Act, decisions interpret-
ing the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations provide useful gui-
dance as to 'the meaning of the same terms in the new law."'). Id.
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ADA issues involved in Martin and Olinger. However, several
federal circuit courts of appeal and district courts have inter-
preted Title III in the context of athletics. While none of these
decisions dealt with professional sports, many of the cases in-
volved issues analogous to those present in Martin and Olinger.
The Sixth Circuit decision in Sandison v. Michigan High
School Athletic Association138 is one such case. The controversy
involved two high school students with learning disabilities
which caused them to fall two grades behind other students of
the same age. 139 As a result, both were nineteen years old at
the beginning of their senior year.140 The students, who were
both athletes, were prevented from competing after age
nineteen due to a Michigan High School Athletic Association
(MHSAA) regulation that prohibited participation by any stu-
dent of that age.' 4 ' The students brought suit under the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act seeking an injunction allowing them
to compete, which the district court granted.142 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, reversed and held that waiving the age require-
ment rule would fundamentally alter the sports program. 143
The court focused on the purposes of the age restriction, to pre-
vent injury to other players and to prevent unfair competitive
advantage that older players may have. 44 Reasoning that the
waiver would have a serious effect on the competition, the court
held a waiver would result in a fundamental alteration, thus
not a reasonable accommodation. 145 In addition, the court
found that the "daunting task"146 of conducting an individual-
ized evaluation of each older student's abilities to determine if
there is an unfair advantage was not a reasonable
accommodation. 147
In McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Associa-
tion,148 a similar MHSAA rule came under attack. The rule in
138. 64 F.3d 1026 (6 th Cir. 1995).
139. See id. at 1028.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037.
144. See id. at 1035.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1037.
147. See id. at 1037.
148. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
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issue limited student participation in school sports to athletes
who had not yet completed eight semesters of high school. 149 A
learning-disabled student athlete, who had completed eight
semesters, challenged the rule under the ADA and Rehabilita-
tion Act. 150 Following Sandison, the Sixth Circuit held that
waiving the rule would work a fundamental alteration in the
program because the age restriction "is a necessary require-
ment."1 51 The McPherson decision seems to go farther than
Sandison in holding that forcing the MHSAA to make "near im-
possible determinations"'152 about a student's physical and ath-
letic maturity would "impose an immense financial and
administrative burden."'15 3
Finally, the Eighth Circuit was faced with a challenge to a
high school sports age limitation in Pottgen v. Missouri State
High School Activities Association.54 Pottgen had repeated two
grades in elementary school due to learning disabilities, thereby
causing him to turn nineteen before his senior year.155 The reg-
ulation, like that in Sandison, prohibited him from playing due
to his age. 156 Pottgen filed suit under the ADA and Rehabilita-
tion Act after his request for a waiver was denied. 157 The
Eighth Circuit denied his claim, focusing on the determination
that the rule was essential to the sports program, and that the
MSHAA would face an "undue financial and administrative
burden"'158 if required to conduct an individualized inquiry into
each student waiver request. 159
149. See id. at 455.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 461.
152. Id. at 462.
153. McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462.
154. 40 F.3d 926 (8 th Cir. 1994).
155. See id. at 928.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 927.
158. Id. at 931 (quoting School Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987)).
159. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929-31. The court focused on the value of the
rule, such as reducing the advantage afforded to older student-athletes, protecting
younger student-athletes from injury, discouraging students from delaying their
education to become more athletically mature, and to prevent coaches from taking
advantage of the relaxation of age requirements by repeated red-shirting. See id.
at 929-30.
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In his dissent, Chief Judge Arnold attacked the absence of a
specific inquiry into the circumstances of the plaintiff in
Pottgen.160 He argued that "courts are obligated by statute to
look at plaintiffs as individuals" when interpreting claims
under the ADA.161 Furthermore, he felt that if this type of indi-
vidual inquiry were conducted in Pottgen, it would be clear that
the age requirement "is not essential."162 Since the rule could
be modified in this instance "without doing violence to its essen-
tial purposes," Chief Judge Arnold argued that the rule could
not properly be characterized as "essential to the nature of the
program."163
The district court cases that have interpreted Title III in
the context of competitive sports provide another means of anal-
ysis. One such opinion is Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 64 where a
youth hockey player suffering from attention deficit disorder
was denied his request to play in a younger league with his fa-
ther on his ice. 165 The defendant denied the request due to con-
cerns over safety risks and the disruptive atmosphere it would
create for other players. 166 The plaintiff brought suit under Ti-
tle III, and the court denied his request, thereby providing a
line of analysis not accepted in either Martin or Olinger. 167 The
court held that the plaintiff was not actually denied entrance to
a place of public accommodation, because he was allowed in the
hockey rink.168 The court made a distinction between being de-
nied access to the league and being denied entrance to the rink
160. See id. at 931 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931. Chief Judge Arnold noted that Pottgen would
have been eligible to play if the "requirement had been modified by only thirty-five
days." Id. at 932. Because he was "that close" to compliance, Arnold argued that
none of the purposes of the rule would be violated. See id. There was no contention
that Pottgen had "deliberately repeated the first and third grades to make himself
eligible to play baseball another year at age nineteen." Id. Also, "any competitive
advantage resulting from plaintiffs age is de minimis." Id. Furthermore, he ac-
cepted the district court finding that Pottgen "does not appear to constitute a
threat to the safety of others." Id.
163. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 933.
164. 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
165. See id. at 218.
166. See Parent, supra note 22, at 138. See also Elitt, 922 F. Supp. 217.
167. See Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 225.
168. See id. at 223.
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itself.169 The court held the membership organization, the
league, was not a "public accommodation" within the ADA.170
The holding in Brown v. Tenet ParaAmerica'7' relied on
and followed the analysis used in Elitt. The court held that Ti-
tle III did not apply to the organizers of a bicycle race because
they were an "association or organizing group."1 72 Therefore,
"the defendants are closer in identity to a youth hockey ...
league, which have not been found to be a public accommoda-
tion. Mr. Brown [did] not allege that he was denied access to a
physical place. He allege[d] that he was denied a chance to
participate." 7 3
Ganden v. NCAA174 involved an ADA challenge to the
NCAA's minimum academic eligibility requirements for stu-
dent-athletes. 175 Ganden, a learning-disabled swimmer, chal-
lenged these requirements when he was declared ineligible,
arguing that the NCAA had failed to make reasonable modifica-
tions to accommodate his learning disability. 76 In denying his
claim, the district court focused on the underlying purposes of
the requirements to determine if a modification of these rules
was reasonable. 177 The court determined that the underlying
purpose was "insuring the integrity of.. [a student's] GPA and
independently insuring that the student has covered the mini-
mum subject matter required for college." 178 The court then
conducted a specific inquiry into Ganden's situation and deter-
mined that lowering the GPA requirement would be a funda-
mental alteration within the meaning of the ADA.179
Though there is a common theme of giving deference to
rules with a valid purpose present in these cases, a problem per-
sists. To what extent do these cases actually provide insight
into how the Supreme Court will decide Martin? The strength
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
172. Id. at 499.
173. Id.
174. No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996).
175. See id. at *13.
176. See id. at *13-14.
177. See id. at *48.
178. Id. at *46.
179. See Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *48.
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of these cases in assisting a prediction is questionable at best.
There is a need to examine Supreme Court decisions for gui-
dance. In addition, due to the lack of direct Title III precedent,
an analysis into analogous situations is appropriate.
PART IV - Analogous U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
A. Places of Public Accommodation
The Supreme Court has given a broad reading to "places of
public accommodation" in contexts outside the ADA. For exam-
ple, the Court has interpreted the phrase in decisions interpret-
ing the Civil Rights Act. 80 For example, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. U.S.,181 the Court interpreted a "place of public accom-
modation" very broadly, and a similar reading was conducted in
Daniel v. Paul.8 2 In Daniel, the Court held that an establish-
ment with a snack bar is a "place of public accommodation"
within the Civil Rights Act since it is "principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises." 8 3 While both of
these decisions were more involved with the establishment's re-
lationship to interstate commerce, both recognized a broad con-
struction of the term "place of public accommodation." 18 4
It is interesting to note that the ADA as enacted is broader
than the Civil Rights Act, due to the words, "by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accom-
modation." 8 5 This breadth, combined with the Court's broad
reading of a "place of public accommodation" under that Act,
supports the argument that the Court will consider the ADA
applicable to the golf course in Martin.
B. Fundamental Alterations
The concept of "fundamental alterations" originated in the
Supreme Court case of Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis'8 6 where the Court discussed the reasonableness of an ac-
180. See Hentges, supra note 22, at 165 (describing the Court's broad reading
of "places of public accommodation" in past decisions).
181. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
182. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
183. Id.
184. See Hentges, supra note 22, at 165.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). See also Hentges, supra note 22, at 165.
186. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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commodation under the Rehabilitation Act. Davis declared an
accommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes "undue fi-
nancial and administrative burdens"1 8 7 or requires a "funda-
mental alteration in the nature of [the] program."188
Thereafter, the "fundamental alteration" phrase was included
in the ADA when enacted. For this reason, case analysis of the
reasonable accommodation requirement in the Rehabilitation
Act "is easily transferable to the Title III [ADA] reasonable
modifications context." 8 9
An often-cited employment claim under the Rehabilitation
Act is School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.190 The Court
held that a court should make an "individualized inquiry" into
the facts to determine if a proposed modification is reasona-
ble.' 91 "Such an inquiry is essential" if the Rehabilitation Act is
to "achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from
deprivations." 92 The Court also cited Davis for the two-part
test of whether an accommodation is reasonable, either an un-
due financial and administrative burden or a fundamental al-
teration in the nature of the program. 193
PART V - Analysis
The case law interpreting Title III in the context of sports
provides limited and somewhat conflicting guidance. The anal-
ysis in Sandison, McPherson, and Pottgen seem to echo the rea-
soning used by the district court and Seventh Circuit in Olinger.
Each of the opinions focused on the individual circumstances of
the public accommodation in the determining the reasonable-
ness of the requested modification. Also, none of the courts con-
ducted an inquiry into the specific circumstances of the plaintiff
in issue, as the courts deciding Martin so zealously stressed.
Sandison, McPherson, Pottgen and Olinger all seem to give def-
erence to an organizational rule if its purpose is to ensure a
187. Id. at 412.
188. Id. at 410.
189. Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 ( 5 th Cir.
1997).
190. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
191. Id. at 287.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 287 n.17.
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"level playing field." This is directly at odds with the holding in
Martin, where the inquiry focused on whether allowing a spe-
cific plaintiff the requested accommodation would work a fun-
damental alteration. 94
Judge Arnold's dissenting argument 195 mirrors the line of
analysis used in Martin. The Ninth Circuit focused on the fact
that allowing Casey Martin to use a cart would not fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the program or alter the level playing
field. Likewise, Chief Judge Arnold focused on the reasons why
allowing Pottgen to play past age nineteen would not alter the
fairness on the playing field.
The Elitt and Brown opinions provide a line of reasoning
that makes a distinction between a spectator and a player. This
type of analysis was argued in Martin and Olinger, in that only
the part of the course open to the spectators can properly be
called a "place of public accommodation." 96 The reasoning in
Elitt and Brown has inherent weaknesses because it would
make it almost impossible for a disabled athlete to obtain in-
junctive relief under the ADA. 97 Furthermore, if the court in
either Martin or Olinger would have used this line of reasoning,
both cases could have been dismissed on narrow grounds be-
cause both the PGA and the USGA are "associations or organiz-
ing groups" comparable to a youth hockey league.
Finally, the Ganden opinion seems to follow a line of rea-
soning present in the Olinger case: that an organizational rule
with a valid purpose should be upheld, because any alteration
would be "fundamental" and not required by the ADA. This test
was also controlling in Sandison, McPherson and Pottgen.
These cases all focused heavily on the nature of the public ac-
commodation, not the handicapped individual requesting a
194. See Martin III, 204 F.3d at 1001.
195. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
196. See supra Part I. In both Martin and Olinger, this argument was not
accepted.
197. See Baker, supra note 22, at 760. Baker argues that the view in Ellit
raises a potential problem for a plaintiff suing a sports league for the right to par-
ticipate as a disabled athlete. For example, Baker uses the hypothetical case of a
football player suing the NFL for failure to make reasonable accommodations.
Under the reasoning in Elitt, the plaintiff would not have the right to sue, because
the plaintiff is not prevented from entering an NFL stadium as a spectator. See id.
at 759.
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modification. Based on this line of cases, it would seem that the
reasoning used in Martin, that an inquiry must determine what
effect allowing one specific plaintiff the requested modification
would have, is the minority position. Even with the common
theme of these cases, the weight to be afforded these decisions is
most likely not controlling. There is a need to analyze the lim-
ited Supreme Court precedent that is available.
In terms of the definition of a "public accommodation"
under the ADA, it is clear that the Court has read the phrase
broadly in other contexts.198 In addition, the fact that the ADA
specifically lists "golf course" as a covered entity1 99 may sway
the Court. If the Court uses a textualist method of analysis, as
the district court did in Martin,200 it will most likely hold that
the course used for a golf tournament is covered. In addition,
due to the stated purposes of the ADA, mainly to combat dis-
crimination, the Court will most likely agree with the district
court in Martin that no organization can "relegate the ADA to
hop-scotch areas,"20' thereby claiming only parts of the facility
are subject to the ADA.
This issue will have to be addressed because the PGA's
main contention has been that only the portion of the course
open to spectators is subject to the ADA, while the competition
area "inside the ropes" is not.20 2 The past Supreme Court read-
ing of "places of public accommodation," combined with the pur-
pose of the ADA to combat discrimination in all walks of life,203
will most likely cause the Court to reject this argument and
hold that a course used for a PGA tournament is a "place of
public accommodation" subject to the ADA.
Assuming the Court declares a golf course used for a PGA
Tour competition a "place of public accommodation," the Court
will likely then apply the two-part test of reasonableness of an
accommodation, as expressed in Arline.20 4 This Arline analysis
198. See supra Part IV.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
200. See supra Part IA. The district court specifically noted that "golf course"
is listed as a "place of public accommodation" subject to the ADA. See also Martin
1, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
201. Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
202. See supra Part IA.
203. See supra Part II.
204. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17.
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cuts toward a Supreme Court decision affirming Martin. The
Court stressed the propriety of a plaintiff specific inquiry to de-
termine reasonableness, as was pushed in both Martin opin-
ions.205 This argument is more persuasive when the Arline test
is applied to the facts in Martin.
Applying this test: 1) Martin's proposed accommodation
does not involve an undue financial or administrative burden,
when based on a specific inquiry. When each case is looked at
on specific facts, a determination can be made as to whether a
player is disabled to the point that he will not be at a competi-
tive advantage by use of a cart. If the Court looks at the circum-
stances in the abstract, as the Olinger courts did, it may find an
undue administrative burden. 2) Based on a specific inquiry,
Martin's golf cart use does not work a fundamental alteration in
the nature of the tournaments. This conclusion is based on one
element: the acceptance of the district court's findings that
there is no "fatigue factor" injected into the game of golf. If the
Supreme Court accepts this, and conducts a specific inquiry,
they will affirm the case and hold that the modification is
reasonable.
On the other hand, if the Court does not accept the findings
of fact, and accepts the argument that walking imposes fatigue
on a player, it may reverse. Thus, the entire "fundamental al-
teration" issue will boil down to the standard of review the Su-
preme Court will apply to the Martin decision below.
The Supreme Court will apply the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review to the findings of fact made by the District Court
for the District of Oregon.20 6 A finding of fact is "clearly errone-
ous" when, although there is evidence to support it, the review-
ing court is left with "the definite and firm conviction" that a
mistake has been committed, on the entire evidence. 20 7 Fur-
thermore, a reviewing court cannot reverse findings of fact sim-
ply because it would have decided the case differently.208 This
205. See supra Part IA.
206. See Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470
U.S. 564 (1985); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1954).
207. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
208. See id. The Anderson opinion also states that a reviewing court over-
steps the bounds of its duty if it decides factual issues de novo. See id.
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standard is "significantly deferential" 20 9 to the factual findings
of the district court. In light of this deference, the Supreme
Court will affirm the finding that there is no significant element
of fatigue injected into golf by walking.
The severity of Martin's condition causes him more fatigue
than any healthy golfer who walks 18 holes. The Olinger
courts, due to the non-specific inquiry used, ignored this con-
cept, which can properly be applied to Ford Olinger as well.
Since the Court will most likely engage in a specific inquiry into
Martin's personal conditions, they will affirm this aspect of the
case, based on the record. There is enough medical testimony
as to Martin's condition, as well as about the lack of fatigue in
golf, to compel the court to affirm. This evidence will not leave
the members of the Court, or at least a majority, with a "firm
and definite conviction" that a mistake has been made.210 Thus,
the Court will find no fundamental alteration in the PGA Tour
tournaments by allowing Martin his requested modification.
PART VI - Conclusion
The cases of disabled golfers Casey Martin and Ford Olin-
ger have done more than create uproar in the sports world.
More importantly, they have raised important issues as to how
far entities must go in modifying their programs to accommo-
date disabled individuals. There is no doubt that the disabled
should be given every reasonable opportunity to enjoy the facili-
ties, privileges and services that others enjoy. The question is
where should the line be drawn between reasonable and unrea-
sonable modifications. Will a Supreme Court decision affirming
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Martin change the face of sports
as we know it? Will the rules of sports become unimportant,
having to bend every time someone with a disability wants to
play? Most likely the ADA's fundamental alteration defense
will prevent this from ever happening. Both Martin and Olin-
ger have severe conditions, and they both play a sport where
fatigue plays a small factor, at best. It would be a stretch of the
209. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 623. It is also important to note that the Su-
preme Court does not have to answer whether or not the Ninth Circuit's findings
in Martin were clearly erroneous, but rather the focus is on the findings of fact in
the district court. See McAllister, 348 U.S. at 20-21.
210. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
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imagination to believe that the ADA would allow an individual
in a wheelchair to play a sport like professional football.
The more important consideration is the effect Martin's
successful claim could have on future Title III litigation. First,
if the Court upholds the Ninth Circuit's holding, the definition
of a "place of public accommodation" will be substantially broad-
ened. This may result in a number of questionable suits, re-
quiring the courts to draw limitations. Moreover, the
"fundamental alteration" concept will be seriously modified, in
light of the view used in decisions such as Sandison, McPher-
son, and Pottgen. The concept used in those cases, that a rule
with a valid purpose should be given deference, will be directly
at odds with new Supreme Court precedent requiring an indi-
vidualized inquiry into specific circumstances.
While affirming Martin may cause new problems and is-
sues for the courts, the fact that Casey Martin has a valid claim
cannot be denied. The circumstances in this case warrant a
modification in the PGA Tour's rules due to Casey's specific con-
dition. A case with such unique circumstances warrants a
change in the minds of organizations such as the PGA Tour. No
longer will they have the ability to keep out whomever they
want due to tradition or whatever else they deem important.
ADDENDUM
Following the completion of this article, but prior to final
publication, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in the
Martin case. 211 The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, and held
that "petitioner's golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit com-
fortably within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within its
protection."212 In deciding that Martin's cart use would not fun-
damentally alter the Tour's programs, the Court concluded that
"Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits petitioner
from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his
disability."213
211. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
212. Id. 1890.
213. Id.
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